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The conceptions of Bayes and Neyman-Pearson are 
considered in methodological literature as irreconcilable 
opponents as for their goals, tasks, and methods of solving 
statistical problems [1-3]. This article demonstrates that in 
some respects important for the statistical practice the 
methodological principles of the conceptions of Bayes (BC) 
and Fisher (FC), the last is ideologically close to Neyman- 
Pearson, reveal the similarity in positions. As an alternative 
to these directions of investigations an empirical concep-
tion is proposed. Let us start with some critical arguments 
against Bayes and Fisher's conceptions. 
Arguments against Bayes' conception are as follows. 
1. The proponents of Bayes' conception are accused of 
subjectivism which becomes apparent in the assigning of a 
priori probabilities. What is especially criticized is the idea 
of using the uniform distribution in the case of the lack of 
knowledge about the described state of affairs.  
2. The followers of the Bayesian paradigm maintain that 
the calculation of probabilities based on Bayes theorem 
amounts to the inductive logic. Their opponents argue that 
methods of induction along with Bayes theorem do not 
constitute logic. 
3. The most important task of the inductive logic is to 
determine the degree of hypotheses confirmation. The 
solution of this problem proves to be sensitive to the 
choice of probabilistic measure. In certain situations every 
measure leads to paradoxical solutions. In addition, very 
often there are no conclusive proofs in favor of a measure 
for formal description of a concrete situation.  
4. Hypotheses verification does not originate from this 
paradigm. It is an adaptation of the classical statistics.  
5. The notion of confidence probability for the estimation 
of the distribution parameter, which is constant, is not 
correct because the constant falls on the interval with the 
probability either one or zero. All intermediate probabilities 
between zero and one which are used in Bayesian 
methodology do not make any sense.  
6. The adequacy of the Bayesian paradigm for scientific 
applications is also criticized. Scientists are not Bayesians.  
In its turn the arguments against Fisher's conception are 
as follows. 
1. The inability of using a priori information came under 
criticism. 
2. The verification of hypotheses is the most important 
task of Fisher's conception. The methodology of the 
hypotheses verification came under criticism. 
3. The followers of the Bayesian paradigm point out that 
in the framework of Fisher's conception there is no unique 
confidence interval. Confidence probability is determined 
for the multitude of intervals. In particular, when solving the 
problem of parameters estimation, it is not known on which 
interval falls the required parameter.  
4. The objective character of Fisher's paradigm is 
denied. In objectivist conceptions probabilities are 
assigned to the events that have not yet happened. For 
this reason the probability of event depends on the place 
and time this event happens.  
5. The adequacy of the Fisherian conception for scien-
tific applications is also criticized. 
In spite of differences between the approaches (BC) and 
(FC) they are methodologically similar. 
1. Both lines of inquiry are model oriented. In both 
approaches the problem of model building, which is crucial 
for special sciences, is ignored. (BC) as well as (FC) 
assume that a model is given and what is necessary is to 
specify its unknown parameters.  
For example, the problem of the estimation of distribu-
tions parameters belongs to this class of tasks. From the 
very beginning, much more information is assumed known 
(model ) than to be additionally obtained (model parame-
ters). 
In science, like in any other domain of rational thinking, 
behaving, and acting, it was always conventional to move 
from solving simple tasks to investigating complex 
problems. With this in mind, it seems unreasonable to build 
a statistical distribution with the mean and dispersion as 
parameters in the beginning, in order to determine the 
mean, dispersion, and other statistical characteristics.  
2. In both approaches, basic features of models, like 
independence, are either considered given a priori or 
presupposed on the basis of intuitive considerations. It is 
assumed that if the investigations are conducted in 
controllable conditions and the experiments are independ-
ent, the results of the experiments will also be independ-
ent. 
3. Solutions of many problems, like estimating the 
distribution parameters or building regressive models, lead 
to the same or similar quantitative results. Of course, the 
interpretation of the solutions in both cases will be 
different. 
4. The parameters estimation criteria (consistency, 
unbiasedness and efficiency) are used in both ap-
proaches.  
5. The used methods of parameters estimation are not 
robust because the estimations obtained much unbiased 
even in the case of a small deviation of statistical charac-
teristics of data from model ones. 
6. Each approach criticizes the methodological principles 
of the concurrent one. For instance, the groundlessness of 
the conception of hypotheses confirmation in Bayes' 
approach caused by the problem of measures multiplicity 
is criticized. At the same time, a satisfactory solution of this 
problem cannot be found in the framework of Fisher's 
approach as well. In its turn, the methodology of hypothe-
ses verification in Fisher's analysis is criticized from the 
Bayesian point of view. The latter, however, does not 
propose any ways of improving the verification of hypothe-
ses. 
The empirical conception of statistics developed by 
Alimov is an alternative to BC and FC methodology. The 
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main task of the empirical metrological conception (EMC) 
consists in constructing a semi-empirical model of data. 
The semi-empirical model of data is effective for prognosis, 
if the semi-empirical parameters of the model are robust. 
Theoretical characteristics are the representation of the 
stable semi-empirical characteristics. General basic 
characteristics of the data model, like uniformity and 
independence, are neither considered given a priori nor 
presupposed on the basis of intuitive considerations (for 
example, experiments are conducted in controllable 
conditions and independently from one another; therefore 
the model of independent observation is accepted). 
Instead, they are obtained on the basis of the formal 
examination of independence, uniformity, and other 
characteristics. If the formal independence is obtained, 
there are reasons for cautious claim that the experiments 
were truly conducted in independent conditions.  
EMC criticizes Fisher's methodology of hypotheses 
verification. The point is that Fisher's methodology 
presupposes that the distribution of the criterion statistic is 
known up to small probabilities. The main principle of the 
hypotheses verification consists in the refutation of the 
hypothesis, even if it is true, once in the only conducted 
experiment a low-probable event happens. 
This method is convincing neither for acceptance nor for 
refutation of the hypothesis. A convincing way of the 
hypothesis refutation consists in the discovering of an 
essential difference between the frequency of real event 
and its probability, provided that the hypothesis is true. 
This method is based on frequency and requires many 
experiments to be conducted.  
In order to demonstrate that the appeal to small prob-
abilities is not realistic, let us show that for the convincing 
estimation of the probability about 10**(-n) we need about 
10**(n+1) experiments.  
Suppose that we examine the frequency of an event 
ϖm(A), where m is the quantity of the conducted experi-
ments. Denote by sk the number of test in which the event 
A happened k-th time. When passing from m=sk-1 to m=sk 
the frequency changes from 
ϖ(sk-1) = (k-1)/(sk-1) to ϖsk = k/sk.  
The relative frequency leap in this transition is equal to  
δ(k)= (ϖsk(A)- ϖsk-1(A))/ ϖsk(A)=(sk-k)/(sk-1)k 
For rare events sk>>k and therefore δ(k) is approximately 
equal 1/k. 
Therefore, only when k>10 the relative increase in 
frequency will be less than 10%. 
A weakness of the contemporary estimation methods 
consists in that they do not provide stable estimations. The 
most powerful estimation method is the method of 
maximum likelihood (MMP). It starts from the assumption 
that the results obtained are independent and the 
maximum value is assigned to their combined density. 
Method MMP is exact, if data completely fit with its various 
requirements. In case of a small deviation of the data 
actual characteristics from the necessary model charac-
teristics, the obtained estimations very often have large 
bias. As a rule, in the practice of using the method MMP 
the change in combined density value for different data is 
not examined in order to determine on which data the 
combined density will be actually maximal. How the results 
will change when the combined density of the obtained 
results is not maximal is not examined as well. 
The applied criteria of the quality of estimation have no 
pragmatic value. The popular criterion of the quality, which 
is consistency, does not allow one to estimate how the 
estimation obtained from the end sample differs from the 
optimal estimation derived from the presupposition that 
there is an infinite sample of data. 
The methodology of building confidence intervals in BC 
and FC is also criticized in the empirical conception. In BC 
one speaks of the probability of a constant's fall on an 
interval. In FC one finds a multiplicity of intervals, and it is 
not clear how to use them. The empirical conception 
suggests a constructive procedure for building a unique 
"confidence interval". The probability of the falling on the 
interval is not determined. To illustrate this approach let us 
consider the estimation of the average value. Data are 
divided on groups with the equal level. For each group the 
average value is calculated. Minimal and maximal average 
values are the edges of the actual " confidence interval". 
Then we make the obtained interval more accurate on the 
basis of new data with more level and more number of 
groups. If we find an interval with the length not exceeding 
the permissible error, we can speak of the stable estima-
tion of the semi-empirical average value and of the 
building of the confidence interval for it.  
To determine the values estimations that are essentially 
connected to the values whose estimations prove to be 
stable the methodological principles representing the 
development of the methodology of using mathematics in 
natural sciences (first suggested probably by Comte) are 
used. Comte argued: let a variable X take values x1, x2,… 
xn, and these values can be measured. Another variable Y 
is not measurable. The role of mathematics consists in 
describing the dependency F between the variables X and 
Y. If the variable X is measured with permissible error, the 
solution of the equations set F(Y)=X allows one to 
determine the required values of the variable Y. 
It is assumed in the statistical literature that the theorem 
of the law of large numbers has a special empirical 
significance. In conclusion the special epistemological and 
heuristic significance of the theorem of the law of large 
numbers which is often considered as a corner stone of 
statistics is criticized.  
In the simplest case the theorem of the law of large 
numbers is stated as follows.  
Theorem. Let μ be the number of occurrences of the event 
A in n independent tests, and p be the probability of the 
occurrence of A in each test. Then, whatever ε > 0,  
lim P{⏐μ/n-p(A)⏐< ε}=1 (1)  
n→∞  
The problem of the status of the theorem of the law of 
large numbers appears. Is it probability-theoretical? That is 
to say, does it allow one to calculate the probabilities of 
events on the basis of elementary probabilities or does this 
theorem allow one to reveal and verify primary probabilistic 
characteristics, for example, to determine the stability of 
frequencies, and thus belong to mathematical statistics? 
In the theorem of the law of large numbers the theoreti-
cal value "the probability of success" is given a priori, and 
thus the theorem cannot be used in order to determine this 
already known probability. The conclusion of the theorem 
speaks of the event's probability, which consists in the 
difference between the probability and frequency of the 
event A. The event in the applied probabilistic theory is a 
result of any experiment. The probability of event is a 
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theoretical value. That is why the probability of event 
cannot be a result of a real test. 
In the empirical interpretation the probability of event is 
determined if and only if the corresponding frequency is 
stable. In the empirical approach the external probability in 
the expression (1) should be replaced by frequency. The 
conclusion then takes the following form: 
ωn{|μ⁄n-p(A)⏐< ε}=1 (2). 
In the expression (2) the symbol ω denotes frequency and 
the symbol n designates a large number. 
Furthermore, the conclusion of the theorem rewritten with 
the help of the expression (2) speaks of the frequency of 
the deviation of the absolute difference between the 
probability of the event A and the frequency of the same 
event, provided this difference is less than ε. The heuristic 
significance of the theorem conclusion for determining the 
stability of the frequency in its empirical interpretation is in 
doubt. Indeed, if the probability of the event A is close to 
zero, the conclusion of the theorem speaks of the 
frequency of the frequency of the event A. Supposing that 
the theorem has a heuristic significance, it should consist 
in assuming to be possible to determine the stability of the 
frequency of the event A from the frequency of the event 
A.  
It is obvious that the methodological significance of this 
interpretation of the theorem is overestimated.  
First, to determine the frequency of the deviation of the 
frequency of the event A from the probability is not 
possible without determining before the frequency of the 
event A. Second, in order to use the frequency of the 
frequency of event for determining the stability of the 
event, it is necessary before to make certain of the stability 
of the frequency from the frequency of event. To push the 
analogy further, in order to make certain of the stability of 
the frequency from the frequency of the event A it is 
necessary to use more complex construction. Namely, one 
needs the frequency of the frequency of the event B, which 
is in its turn the frequency of the event A. There is a logical 
circle here.  
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